Crises of democratic representation.

Diagnoses about the crisis of political representation or, more representative democracy are well known to us and have followed it since its inception. On the one hand, we might suggest that the roots of this kind of "critical permanent "rests on the tension arising from the encounter and confluence of two traditions of difficult conciliation, perhaps antagonistic: democratic and representative (Pitkin, 2004). On the other hand, we could trace the source to the cyclical and recurrent nature of such diagnosis in the constitutive aporia of the concept of representation itself. In the latter In this sense, joining with the democratic tradition would have the effect of potentializing the dilemmas placed by the political task of making present, in some sense, something or someone who, however, is not literally present (Pitkin 1967: 8-9). In the case of democracy modern, there would be a constitutive dissociation between the real people, dispersed in immanence of empirically given social relations, and the People as a legitimizing idea, that is, while the political subject of democratic sovereignty. Such a hiatus incessant search, permanently unfinished, unreachable or identity and instantiation of this collective subject (Lefort 1981, Rosanvallon 1998). That is, distance between the royal people and the People-sovereign reveals to what extent the "Critical state" is constitutive of the modern democratic regime. In a sense it is possible to recognize, therefore, that such regimes, as historians of the democracy (Dunn, 2016), enter crises being forced, permanently, to redefine in a more inclusive way, as there is a continuous pressure to extend the elements constitutive of the identity of this abstract and uncertain political subject. [...] Clique aqui

Justice, Democracy and Taxation: between considerations of efficiency and equity

In spite of the epistemic polysemy that the concept of political democracy evokes, We could certainly say that this concept has as its fundamental the notion of political equality. Although there are different theoretical conceptions about meaning of political equality, its scope and the institutions and procedures that could best guarantee it, no democratic theory tells us that inequality is the value by which the concept of democracy is based, as well as the value at which democratic institutions are justified. Being, therefore, the political equality the mast that supports, at least normatively, the banner of democracy, we might wonder to what extent the existence of inequities, here thought in terms of distribution, could compromise the legitimacy of the democratic political regime by making politics permeable to economic power: Can the political democracy legitimately coexist with socioeconomic inequalities? To discuss this point, we need to discuss the consequences of the association between political democracy and market economy. As Dahl2 tells us: "Although not all capitalist countries are or have been democratic, all democratic countries have capitalist economies ". Such historical evidence served as a rhetorical piece for the arguments in defense of the market economy as a necessary condition for the flourishing of the political democracy. However, rather than symbiotic, the relationship between democracy and the would be structurally conflictual: the dynamics and logic that make political democracy and would be antagonistic. The market and the democratic political system are two divergent ways of allocating resources. In the case of the former, resources are always allocated from an allocation that is already unevenly structured, so that only those can decide when and how they will bargain them. The resulting distribution is therefore always unequal In the second case, on the other hand: "The [democratic] State is a system that allocates resources that are not property rights, with rights distributed differently from the market. In these circumstances, only by a stroke of luck will the two mechanisms lead to same result. [...] The democratic rule "one citizen, one vote" exacerbates this divergence by equalizing the right to influence the allocation of resources through the State. [...] Democracy offers those who are poor, oppressed or otherwise dissatisfied with the initial appropriations an opportunity to seek redress through the State " (Przeworski, 1993, p.5). So, in some ways, democracy inevitably threatens property by reversing the allocative logic that is practiced in the marketplace. Due to this voltage there are at least two possible overlapping relationships: (a) democracy, or (b) democratize the market. We do not intend to discuss the implications of these overlaps in this work. At the moment, what we can deduce from them is that the distributional tensions are also related to the conflict between the verdict of the market and democracy. Within this conflict, the claims of justice and (re) distributive variables play an important role in mitigating the unfair market dynamics inevitably produces, even in democratic societies. In this In this sense, the field of tax policy corresponds to a relevant arena of dispute once that taxes can contribute so much to deepening the structure of inequalities that it is by the systemically produced market, how much can be an instrument of justice distributive; on this topic specifically I will discuss in the following section. Clique aqui

Crowd, popular masses and democracy

Manifestly elitist forms of government - such as monarchies, aristocracies, oligarchies, etc. - gradually ceased to be imposed on the peoples with the expansion of representative democracies. However, the depreciation of the masses, deemed incapable by Plato, Aristotle, and other thinkers, gained new impetus in 1895, with a study by Gustave Le Bon. Since then the crowds have been disqualified by such authors as Freud and Ortega y Gasset. The idea that popular masses are incapable of expressing a coherent and organized collective will is hammered in the social imaginary, arguing that agglomerations produce disorder and do not deserve to be heard politically. There is no denying that the crowd can be scary, especially when it is furious. But focusing on the negative aspects of collective action, without even examining the reasons for the people's anger, seems opportunistic strategy directed at refusing mass expressions of popular will. It is possible to reject objective political manifestations of the masses, even when they are just and peaceful. In this way it seeks to disarticulate the great groups, and even more, to isolate people from the nuclei to which they belong or with which they have greater affinity. Political monads are obtained, regroupable only under the banner of political parties, conceived as privileged instruments of democracy. I do not ignore the gains made by giving each person a voice of his own, free of oppressive social mechanisms, such as male chauvinism in the family nucleus, economic domination due to labor ties, or pure violence. The democratic precept 'one head, one vote', when implanted through universal and secret litigation, seeks to avoid undue interference in individual choices. Such a benefit occurs only in thesis. In practice, no one expresses his will with all that freedom. You have to opt for a predefined list of nominations, and in general, such nominations are linked to party interests, or rather, to the wishes of those who sponsor them. Now, political parties are highly oligarchic organizations, as Michels (2015 [1915]) and Duverger (2012 [1951]) have shown. In this way, instead of the popular power promised by the democracy, falls to an elitist domination, but disguised by the intermediation of the polls. In fact, the archaic forms that chained the people by golden cages, in various models, the so-called degrees of democracy, euphemism for the absence of political equality and popular power, were changed. It is this conflict that interests me here, between the individual and collective wills, of real and fictitious people. I shall first restate some of the central objections by which the disqualification of the popular masses was constructed, a negative description, which leads to the inability of the assembled people as a democratic foundation, although in its origin democracy is just that, a multitude gathered to decide. Secondly, I will argue that crowds should be understood as manifestations of popular power, even when they act through protest. It is a positive step, legitimizing forms of social organization independent of the state. I believe that collective actions are fundamental to people's political life. These are questions of reformulation of democracy, and also of opposition to the dominion of the economic over the sociopolitical. Then I will contrast the repudiation of the popular masses with the servile reception of the monetary masses, that is, the repressive treatment given to groups of individuals confronted with legal entities. I will conclude by launching some provocative reflections on democracy without people. Clique aqui


Introduction We aim to highlight the structural analogy between political concepts and fundamental theological concepts, from the study of some central categories of the political philosophy of the German philosopher Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), asaber: Promise, Forgiveness and Love. In this way, we will address the importance of these categories for understanding Arendt's political vision, as well as his concern for a public sphere that does not suppress human spontaneity; that would not destroy the capacity for action, fundamental to the political doing, in the opinion of the thinker. One of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, Hannah Arendt devised politics differently from Thomas Hobbes's theorists of line-up to Carl Schmitt. Politics, according to the author, is not intended to meet human natural needs, of social benefits or to organize the living among human beings through institutions, alienating and extinguishing their freedom so that living together is possible. Not configuring also as a necessary mechanism for differentiation and extreme delimitation between one people and another, for Arendt "the meaning of politics is freedom." And this freedom is intrinsic to the human capacity to start new things through spontaneous action. The mentioned capacity is "inherent in the fact that every human being, simply born in a world that already existed before him and will continue to exist afterwards, is itself a new beginning" (ARENDT, 2013, p.167). To understand, then, the conception of politics of the philosopher in question, we analyze the three important categories above, reappropriated dateology and medieval politics. For the development of such a study, we carried out a bibliographical research, based on Arendt's doctoral thesis "The Concept of Love in Saint Augustine" (1929) and the work "Human Condition" (1951). We also performed a survey of the historical context of the Arendtian production, as well as analyzed by who and how the theological categories were originally used, to understand the meaning of their appropriation. We come to the conclusion that Arendt has given a new meaning to theologically original concepts, secularizing their contents to make them suitable for their political conception. Thus, as we understand together with BrunoPeres Freitas (2012), inspired by the love of the world, human beings use their capacity to forgive and to promise to enjoy political freedom and stabilize, to a certain extent, the consequences of action. This allows them to install new beginnings, bringing newness to the world, respecting the other human beings who share the space of appearance. Secularized appropriation brings to the human world the clear political benefits of using Promise, Forgiveness, and Love. Clique aqui

Social Shame and Critical Theory

SUMMARY: Until then, social shame has been little explored by critical theory, the few paragraphs contained in Axel Honneth's "Fight for Recognition." In this article, I defend the possibility of operating a possible investigation in your body. Initially, I reconstruct the traditional theory of shame (I). Posteriorly, I present two possible paths to a critical theory of social shame. The first as part of the social philosophy project that aims to diagnose the pathologies resulting from of phenomena of injustice, disrespect and humiliation (II). The second as ideology. In this sense, I develop the ideologies of shame in a neoliberal system (III). Keywords: Social shame. Critical theory. Social Philosophy. Criticism of ideology Clique aqui

Hacked Democracy

summary We are in the year 2017 and hardly a day goes by without the big media bringing us news about political actions and social practices involving hackers. The list of news and headlines of the type is long. The frequency of these events is so high that even for the most affluent, keeping up to date is not a simple task. The purpose of this communication is to explore the meaning of the expression "Hacked Democracy" through some examples of recent political events, proposing a political-philosophical approach that could enrich the current debate in the State Theory, especially on the possibilities of democratic system in the current historical-technological contingency. To do this, we will start by briefly indicating the origin of the expression. Then we will analyze some specific cases and try to identify in these cases three distinct perspectives in political relations: the perspective of a State in relation to another State; the perspective of the State in relation to citizens; and, finally, the perspective of the citizen with respect to the State. Rather than offering simplified answers or presenting solutions, the intention of the proposal is to try to formulate the problem and ask questions that may be developed in the future, since this research is still in its initial stages. First of all, research reveals itself as interdisciplinary and forces us to seek understanding in other knowledge, whose research and practices on the information technology era and its impact on political and social relations are more advanced. In this sense, the main objective of this presentation is to investigate if the Political Philosophy can contribute to the interpretation of these emergent phenomena. To do so, we turn to an author whose work is our research and translation theme since 2009, and who was a great defender of the relevance of Political Philosophy in the twentieth century. Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves thought the role of Political Philosophy both as a method of approach to the political problem and also as a discipline of studies in the Universities. In this final moment, we will present the notion and method that the author proposes and, from this, we will try to defend the relevance of this position in the face of the challenges that we face today. Keywords: hacked democracy; Theory of State; Political Philosophy; Alessandro Passerin d'Entrèves Clique aqui

Climate change

Summary: Climate change poses an urgent challenge for democracies modern. Even more, the struggles against the climatic phenomenon cause enormous problems of action collective Can democratic systems evolve to meet these challenges? The present work formulates a post-liberal democracy based on two governing principles, sustainability and democratization of democracy. Whereas climate change, and its consequences, have a considerable impact on the social forms of organization, I will analyze the relationship sustainability and democracy; first, to define what sustainability is and to same time, about their different models. Secondly, to analyze how the new risks caused by climate change require a post-liberal democracy based on the representative forms of democracy whose usefulness can not be fully suppressed. Finally, a model of democracy will be proposed. A bond-centered model between an open sustainability model and an inclusive model of democracy. THE theoretical reflection of these lines will be accompanied by the study of the 'National Plan of Change Climate "of the government of Uruguay, presented a few months ago. Emphasis will be put on process. Keywords: Representative democracy, sustainability, climate change, inclusive democracy, citizen participation. Clique aqui

Dream, aesthetics and politics in Walter Benjamin

In seeking a demarcation on the contribution of philosophy to the debate on the relationship between art and politics, our focus will be the perceptual ability politically related to the critique of embellishment. Our key of reading refers to the concepts of aesthetization of politics and dreamy kitsch (Traumkitsch) according to Walter Benjamin. On the one hand, we will have in mind the relation between perception and the world of things; and, on the other hand, the layer kitsch that resides in the objects inside the home, as a place of refuge of subjectivity, separated from the public sphere. On the one hand, the impossibility of imagining the "blue flower in the world of technology"; on the other, "the blue flower that has turned gray." In both cases, what one wants beautiful turns into a sweetened appearance. It remains for things to reveal the inversion between perception and the world, in order to release a political meaning that transitions from the unconscious to the conscious - from the dream upon awakening. From the awakened collective dream, or from the aesthetic perception to the drowsiness of consumption, there is a dialectic of awakening, revealing political instances. Clique aqui

Adeus ao bem-estar (SMP)

For long time social rights have been discussed around the categories developed by Thomas Marshall (1950). According to this author, civil, political and social rights were introduced in consecutive waves; one could talk, therefore, of three generations of rights. As a matter of fact, this was a twofold process: on the one hand, the scope of individual rights got wider (from civil to political to social rights); on the other, more and more individuals became rightsholders (this is particularly evident in the case of voting rights, which were first limited through censual criteria, then were extended to all male citizens and finally were granted to all citizens with no regard to gender). According to Marshall and those who use his conceptual categories (e.g. Mezzadra 2002, Baglioni 2009), it is precisely this extension of rights as a growing sociopolitical inclusion that allows the identification of the essential nexus between rights and citizenship. The welfare state in all its concrete shapes (for it has many, as shown by Esping-Andersen 1990 among others) incarnates the principle according to which citizenship is to be defined in terms of the fruition of civil, political and social rights. The latter ones are then understood as those rights that grant to citizens the material conditions to concretely enjoy the others, i.e. as the guarantee that civic and political rights will not be granted only formally, but really enjoyed. Clique aqui